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Briefly Noted

Sino-Soviet Tensions Reflected at Afro-Asian Conference in Cairo:

Delegates from thirty nations met at the second Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo from February 12-15. Like its predecessor, this Afro-Asian Writers' Conference was a Communist front gathering and, predictably, full of the usual propaganda harangues. The main issue, which turned out to be an extension of the Sino-Soviet conflict, revolved around a struggle between the delegations of Communist China and Soviet Russia: the Chinese, who won the support of the majority of the delegates in this significant battle, maintained that the ending of colonialism must be given precedence over the liquidation of armament. In spite of this victory over the Soviets, the Chinese were put on the defensive also when the Nigerian delegate sought to raise the Sino-Indian dispute. The Chinese Minister for Culture, Mr. Mao Tun, could only lamely remark that this dispute was between the two governments concerned and was not any affair of the two peoples, -- as if a government and the people it governs have no identity of purpose.

Nikita S. Khrushchev's Birthday: April 17. The first among equals, Nikita Khrushchev, born in 1894, will be sixty-eight years old on the 17th of April. Some may wish to comment on the fact that the matter of his successor, perhaps again involving the collective leadership-triumph of one cycle (which occurred with the death of Lenin and again with that of Stalin) may be about to start all over again in the USSR. Who may the new leader be?

Soviets Exchange Stalin Medals: But Where Are the Monuments to His Victims? An AP release from Moscow on March 15 (New York Times 17 March) reports the Soviet announcement of the same date that foreign holders of Stalin international peace prizes can now trade them in for Lenin Prizes. Holders of Stalin Prizes in the United States include Paul Robeson and author Howard Fast: the latter broke with the Communists several years ago.

At the 22nd CPSU Congress, Khrushchev vowed that the Soviet Union would erect monuments to the memory of Stalin's victims. On the one hand we wonder if the exchange of Lenin for Stalin medals is intended to divert attention from Khrushchev's unfulfilled promise [which is just one of a long series of empty promises]. Nonetheless we propose contests to determine the nature and place of such a monument, making a few appropriate suggestions as examples perhaps. On the other hand we conjecture that those about to receive this signal new honor (i. e. a Lenin Prize) may have to recant all of their former tributes to Stalin along with the medal which has associated them with him.

499. The 22nd CPSU Congress and the Dilemma of the Indian Communists

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**Background:** Left wing (pro-Chinese Communist Party-CCP) and right wing (nationalist and anti-Chinese Communist Party since the Chinese Communists' incursions into India made the latter so unpopular in India) factions have long divided the Communist Party of India (CPI). This split was considerably widened as a result of the bitter disputes that arose at and followed the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in October 1961, such as the vilification of Stalin's name and record, the Sino-Soviet differences, the open feud between the USSR and Albania, etc. By the end of 1961, the right wing of the CPI was: openly criticizing the CCP and was being attacked in return by the CCP; supporting the CPSU generally in its disputes with the CCP and Albania. Furthermore, the CPI itself, like many Communist Parties all over the world, was severely shocked by and divided over the overt CPSU assault upon the revered memory of the great Stalin and regretted, to the extent of publicly saying so, that Khrushchev had so openly revived this issue. In the meanwhile, the left wing of the CPI published statements supporting the CCP in deriding Nehru's policies, censured and sometimes even boycotted the CPI's organ (New Age) for its anti-CCP statements, adopted at least one resolution attacking Khrushchev and the CPSU, and opposed the Soviet moves against Stalin, China, and Albania. The schism grew wider and wider, but was interrupted by two events: the death of the CPI's Secretary General, Ajoy Ghosh, in January 1962; and the Indian national elections the following month. Ajoy Ghosh has still not been replaced and the CPI, which made some relatively minor advances in the elections (it is a matter of dispute whether these were because of anything the CPI has to offer or because of dissatisfaction with the ruling party) emerged - as expected - still India's second national political group but vastly outnumbered by the Congress Party led by Jawaharlal Nehru, which has ruled India since independence.

It will be most difficult to discover any CPI leader who seems capable of conciliating the opposing wings of the CPI in their present hostile mood. The candidate now adjudged to be the most likely winner is E. M. S. Namboodiripad, the former Chief Minister of the (then) Communist government of the State of Kerala, who has aspired to succeed Ghosh for several years and who has, in the absence of Ghosh, served on occasion as Acting Secretary General. However, Namboodiripad has made many gestures toward the left wing of the CPI during the past two years and there are good indications that he is now distrusted by the CPSU as well as the CPI's right wing. When and if Namboodiripad is chosen Secretary General, leftist influence within the CPI central machinery might be increased sufficiently to induce the party militants not to split away - but at the cost of reduced Soviet influence within the Indian party and increased disaffection by the CPI rightists. There is also a faint possibility that a right winger like S. A. Dange - who lost his seat in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) in the recent elections - or even some neutral nonentity, might be chosen, in which case Soviet influence in the party center might not suffer any further loss, but the danger of a leftist split would be increased.

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Background: For over thirty years, Leon Trotsky has been anathema to orthodox Communists. As the principal target of Stalin's campaign to annihilate every immediate or potential political rival, Trotsky and the ideas for which he stood came to represent for the faithful total apostasy. Thus the term "Trotskyism," "Trotskyite" etc., usually coupled with such epithets as "wreckers," "spies," "assassins," became synonymous with the most heinous crimes against communism. During the bloody purge trials of the thirties, a concerted effort was made to link the confessions of the accused (the founding fathers of the Bolshevik Revolution) with the "Judas Trotsky" who was depicted as the arch criminal and agent of imperialism. Thus, throughout these trials it was not only the companions of Lenin who were on trial but more particularly, through them, Trotsky, whom Stalin considered his most dangerous rival. Not content with the annihilation of the Bolshevik old guard, Stalin had to assure that his rival could never return from exile to challenge his authority. Thus, in 1940 Ramon Mercader, whose mother was a leading Spanish Communist and the mistress of the Soviet secret police officer who was directing the operation, insinuated himself into Trotsky's villa in Mexico and took the first convenient opportunity to drive an ice pick through Trotsky's skull. Next, Stalin arranged for the extermination of Trotsky's two daughters and one son in the USSR and the murder of the other son in Paris. In this way, the man who - after Lenin himself - was most responsible for the successful prosecution of the Bolshevik Revolution, who actually translated Lenin's plans into action, who became the first Commissar of Foreign Affairs and then Commissar of War, was brutally murdered and his reputation blackened to satisfy Stalin's paranoid obsessions. As World War II began to occupy Stalin's attention and Hitler became the object of his phobias, Trotsky gradually sank into oblivion in the Communist world. He became an "unperson."


For almost 10 years after Stalin's death, Trotsky remained in the limbo to which Stalin had consigned him. His part in the Revolution was ignored and if his theoretical contributions were mentioned it was only for condemnation and vilification. Even the preliminary revelations of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 failed to affect Trotsky's status. Khrushchev, whose current purposes it suits to associate Mao with the "leftist" theories of Trotsky, is not much more likely to look favorably on Trotsky's rehabilitation than Stalin himself. However, the 22nd Congress set in motion events which - albeit unintentionally - may lead to the long-delayed reappraisal. By linking Stalin to the murder of Kirov, which set the stage for the purge trials, Khrushchev and company were also admitting, if only tacitly, that the trials themselves were also part of Stalin's plot to do away with his rivals and that those involved were in no way guilty of the crimes they were forced to confess. Obviously, if the other Bolshevik leaders were not guilty, neither was Trotsky. This was so apparent that it could not go long unnoticed in the atmosphere of criticism and debate which was stirred up by the Congress. Moreover, Trotsky's widow, who had managed to survive until the 22nd Congress, sent a request to the Congress demanding the rehabilitation of her husband.

Finally, 22 years after his death and some 33 years after his expulsion from the USSR, the case of Trotsky was mentioned in a Communist journal in new terms. This time, the epithets were gone and an attempt was made to examine the case in a relatively factual and equitable manner. In the 17 November 1961 edition of Nuova Generazione, official organ of the Italian Communist Youth Federation, in an article entitled "Let Us Open the Debate on the 22nd Congress," Trotsky was referred to in the following terms:

"The fact that 'the progressive ascendancy of personal power over collective demands (of a democratic nature and origin) and consequently the development of bureaucracy, violation of the law --' did not entail the 'destruction' of those basic features of Soviet society from which it derives its democratic and socialist character, does not exclude but rather necessitates a rigorous historical and ideological verification. For us, the historical problem is not so much one of establishing that during the Stalinist period there were elements of tyranny or the fact that unity of action and direction had to be maintained by exceptional measures and of pointing out therefore Stalin's serious error in having 'illegitimately extended this system to the following period when it was no longer necessary and became only the basis for personal power;' rather it is one of trying to understand why and how it was possible that such a thing could actually occur, Stalin's wishes notwithstanding; this is the weak link in the structure of socialism in the historical form recognized in the Soviet Union. And it is from this point of view that it is extremely interesting and necessary to reconstruct the framework of the political and ideological struggle in the USSR in all its complexity and essence. It is in this sense that we believe that it is possible today to reopen the discussion regarding Trotsky and regarding other personages who shaped the political struggle and the historic development of the Revolution. This certainly is not an attempt to go back to the position taken by Trotsky concerning the problem of constructing socialism in one country; as early as 1917-1918, Lenin indicated the tasks of the working class as follows: 'the task of accomplishing all that can be accomplished in one country to develop, support and awaken the revolution in every country.' And on this point, history has already furnished decisive proof. Rather it is to call attention to the other element brought to light by Lenin and with which Trotsky concerned himself, if not always with acceptable conclusions; and that is concerning the fact that 'the tactic of the socialist proletariat cannot be the same, when the situation in the world is revolutionary as when it is not.' This is not in order to adduce the necessity for the 'permanent revolution' theorized by Trotsky, but to take into account the problems that this situation also imposes on the internal development of socialism, that is the emphasis Trotsky gave to - or better - the problem that Trotsky raised in his work relating to the degeneration of the party or in those works concerning the autonomous function of the unions in the economic direction of society. It is this which is interesting today to know in their exact and total formulation, in their fundamental significance...."

Subsequently, the youth organ was taken to task by the Party. "We criticize the way Nuova Generazione posed the problem [of Trotsky] because of its hasty, superficial and even scandalous... treatment of the problem," said Giancarlo Pajetta, member of the Central Committee Secretariat of the PCI, in an interview with the press during this period. However, even Pajetta admitted that "When Trotsky is mentioned in Russia now, one no longer refers to those criminal charges which up to a point justified the condemnation of Trotskyites. If 'rehabilitation' means establishing that Trotsky was a revolutionary and did not ally himself with the imperialists in a criminal move against the U.S.S.R., I believe this question was not only posed but is in fact already settled."

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
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501. Khrushchev, Bukharin, and the Politics of Scarcity

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Background: Khrushchev's agricultural proposals, presented to the March plenum of the CPSU, are the subject of a forthcoming Guidance. They have, however, more than agricultural significance. For some time Khrushchev has been decentralizing and downgrading Stalin's state apparatus, and he has strengthened the Party apparatus to bolster his personal power. Most of his own high appointees have been Party professionals. But hitherto, the Party has served as a spur to the state; it has not itself tried to assume state administrative functions. Now, under Khrushchev's new agricultural decrees, Party bosses will head agricultural committees on the republic and provincial level, and these committees will control local "production administrations," in which Party and government officials will also participate. This means a merging of Party and state institutions under Party leadership, and may well provide a pattern for the entire Soviet governmental and economic system. At the least, Party organizations from the republics down will assume full responsibility and direct control over agricultural production. Results of this more direct Party responsibility are likely to include:

- a. A single, more monolithic control structure. Khrushchev frankly explained to the plenum that controls extended over agriculture would be stronger than ever before in Soviet history.
- b. Increased emphasis on political inspiration, as opposed to technical knowledge, as a basis for economic planning.
- c. Increased likelihood of failures, due to politically rather than practically inspired administration as well as to other, specific shortcomings in Khrushchev's agricultural plans (e.g., insufficient fertilizer and equipment, exhaustion of the soil, etc.).
- d. Exposure of Party officials to charges of incompetence when failures occur. The temptation to "cover up" such failures will grow stronger, with Party officials more concerned with concealing their own shortcomings than with exposing those of others.
- e. Over a longer term, a reorientation of the outlook of certain Party officials as they become aware of the real problems, and directly responsible for their solution. These officials are likely to become more conservative in setting goals and pledging the fulfillment of quotas; they may develop more of a "trade union" outlook.

Khrushchev's latest proposals once again leave the basic problems unsolved: excessive demands on agriculture, and insufficient incentive.

These problems in turn arise from excessive concentration on heavy industry and arms production for the sake of augmenting the power of the Kremlin.

Khrushchev always attempts to deal with the agriculture and consumer goods problems by denunciation, administrative reshuffling, and "pie in the sky" oratory -- in other words, by use of inspiration and coercion. But inspiration quickly evaporates when one is working under a hot sun. Coercion creates discontent and is only effective in the presence of the supervisor -- therefore many supervisors are required. The most effective incentive, particularly for those who work with hands, rather than with words, is the prospect of fairly immediate material rewards. Khrushchev has recognized the concept of material incentives, but such incentives cannot actually be provided without a basic change in the orientation of Soviet policy. Without producing now the goods consumers want, Khrushchev's talk of material incentives remains only remote, inspirational chatter.

The Soviet Union could organize its economy to satisfy consumer demands. Under the New Economic Policy (1921-1928) such a policy was followed, not for the sake of the consumer, but because it was the only way to get the economy moving again. An extensive debate then took place on the question of how to develop the Soviet economy. Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin, the ablest economist in the Party, the ghost-writer of Stalin's MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION, and the editor of Pravda until 1929, advocated the solution of tolerating private accumulation by peasants, small producers, and even the bourgeoisie, thus providing incentives for increased production in both agriculture and industry. He argued that the prices of the products of state industry should be cut, and that the competition of foreign imports should be permitted. Socialism, Bukharin said, should be made attractive to the peasant, offering him cheap credit, a good market, and better and cheaper goods. But Bukharin lost the debate, since a policy of concentrating on heavy industry and bleeding the peasant white promised the most power to Stalin. The idea of making socialism attractive was basically repellent to Stalin; if people must be attracted, this implies that they possess a veto power. (Bukharin himself was purged in March 1938, after making an heroic defense of his past conduct in court. He formally admitted that he was guilty, and then demonstrated that the government's charges of espionage, sabotage, and wrecking were completely unfounded.)

The Soviet system of industrialization-and-collectivization is sometimes called a system of "enforced saving"; Communists themselves have called it "primitive socialist accumulation." But these terms suggest that the economy is healthy (if frugal); actually, the Soviet economy is sick. Its condition might be described as one of "concealed inflation," an inflation being a situation in which effective demand is greater than supply, and a concealed inflation being a similar situation in which demand is made ineffective by controls and other devices. In an uncontrolled open inflation, as in Germany in 1923 or in the South during the Civil War, prices skyrocket, but wages also rise, if not so rapidly. In a concealed inflation, prices rise less drastically, but wages are probably frozen, and goods are rationed. It takes longer for a man to earn something (see attachment) if

he can get it at all. Whether the coinage is debased or ration cards are issued, the result is the same: the wage-earner is cheated because he is given pay which does not have its alleged value. In effect, he is being forced to work part of the time for nothing. And concealed inflation has other deleterious effects:

a. It encourages the development of black market trading and speculation, and the speculators protect their position by corrupting law enforcement officials and officials in charge of state property.

b. It causes a serious loss of time in waste motion -- consumers wait in line, managers make elaborate time consuming arrangements for covert supply. Even if there is no general shortage, stocks are reduced, so that local shortages occur.

c. It leads to a deterioration in the quality of products, due to a lack of incentive to maintain and improve standards. This makes competition in foreign markets more difficult, and this in turn makes it more difficult to earn foreign exchange.

d. It retards modernization and the introduction of labor saving methods, since labor is a relatively cheap commodity.

e. It encourages the multiplication of enforcement officials, and leads to sterner penalties (witness recent extensions of Soviet death penalties: see Briefly Noted in Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance #86, Item 387 and attachments), and the withdrawal of part of the productive force into occupying and guarding prisons.

f. Despite rigged prices and priorities, it creates obstacles even to the production of favored commodities. A machine tool may be disabled and unproductive for months when a vital part can not be obtained. If vegetable oils cannot be obtained from agriculture the production of paints and varnish is held up (or quality is reduced); machines and buildings which are not painted have a shorter useful life, and require earlier replacement.


g. Above all, it weakens the incentive to produce at all. Private savings are wiped out, and current earnings do not provide a material return worth extending one's self for. So production per man-hour tends to drop.

Aside from the purely economic effects, it will be noticed that inflation tends to depress the morale and morality of the public. And by definition, an inflation is a situation in which the public is not getting what it wants. If such a situation is to be maintained over a long period, dictatorship becomes inevitable; not a dictatorship to carry out a revolution, but a dictatorship of bureaucrats and policemen.

Significantly, the program of rapid, forced-draft industrialization was justified in 1928 on the grounds that the "kulaks" must be stripped of their

veto power, and that the capitalist powers were about to unite against the Soviet Union. It was fairly obvious then that these were not real threats, and diplomatic documents now prove that the foreign threat was an illusion. (When it did become a reality in 1941, Stalin's policies weakened rather than strengthened Soviet defenses.) The kulaks were soon wiped out, but the specter of capitalist encirclement has been a hardy perennial in Soviet speeches ever since, and Khrushchev told the March CPSU plenum it was necessary to "so strengthen the economic and defensive powers of the socialist countries as to protect still more reliably and more fully the forces of socialism against imperialist aggression." Thus Soviet society became enmeshed in a vicious circle: supposed foreign and internal threats are used to justify dictatorship and controls; dictatorship and controls are used to arm the nation and develop its economy in a one-sided way; the arms and the lopsided development cause rival armament abroad and strains within; and foreign armament and internal strain once again justify dictatorship and controls.

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502. The Role of the WPC in the Promotion of International Communism's Demands for General and Complete Disarmament

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Background: The WPC convened in Stockholm in December, intending to examine the question of disarmament. The meetings in Mexico and New Delhi in early 1961 had focused on themes of national liberation, sovereignty, defense of Cuba, etc. Discussion in Stockholm, however, opened with the question of the orientation of the future work of the world peace movement and turned immediately to the nature of the next major assembly of the peace movement to be held in mid-1962. It was this fact that revealed a rift between the Soviet and Chinese positions.

In the postwar decade the Soviet Union, deficient in the field of atomic weapons, utilized the WPC transmission belt to propose the prohibition of these weapons. In 1955, however, the Soviet representative on the UN Disarmament Subcommittee suddenly shifted from the Soviets' adamant position on disarmament -- which had caused an eight-year deadlock on negotiations. He laid before the Subcommittee a 17-page "new" disarmament proposal which, although it precluded an efficacious inspection clause, used ideas and language similar to those of Western proposals, undoubtedly in an attempt to turn the attention of world opinion to the USSR as the "Champion of Peace." One of the WPC meetings of that year, postponed so as to follow the announced reversal of CPSU foreign policy, aped the UN structure. The meeting's "Commission on Disarmament and Atomic Weapons" issued a final report which made quite clear that "the cut and out condemnation of nuclear weapons is possible only in a framework of general reduction of armament...." From that year, with parity in the nuclear field in sight, the Soviet Union promoted general disarmament (i.e. of conventional weapons, troop reductions, etc.) in the interests of "lasting peace" and "economic welfare," and subordinated propaganda on nuclear weapons to a fear campaign. Beginning then, continuing through Khrushchev's disarmament appeal as reiterated at the UN in 1960 and up to the present, the WPC's top officials, national affiliates, and other international Communist front organizations and personalities included in the WPC "roof organization" furthered the disarmament theme. For this purpose, these front elements evolved innumerable variations of two mechanisms: "East-West" exchange of opinion and culture at small meetings intended to have a political impact on the elites; and, mass propaganda rallies, marches and petitions, to develop public protest against, and to change (free world) government policies.

It was not until Communist China had sufficiently consolidated its revolution that Mao Tse-tung took public issue with Soviet strategy thus challenging the ultimate authority of Khrushchev in the bloc and in the world Communist movement. From the time of the Bucharest conference of June 1960 through the December meeting of the WPC, Communist China sought to promote the "national liberation from colonialism" of underdeveloped countries in contrast and often in conflict with Soviet promotion of Communist

26 March 1962

It is the custom of the WPC to hold major biennial conferences which are intended largely as propaganda forums. While some mention had been made at the WPC Presidential meeting (Warsaw, September 1961) of the necessity for holding in 1962 a "Three Continent Conference" of Asian, African and Latin American countries on the subject of "national liberation," that Soviet-dominated meeting had made it clear that such a conference was of less importance than the long-planned "World Congress for Disarmament and Peace," also planned for 1962. (In early December the Chinese, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), proposed and saw passed a motion for that organization's next meeting with Latin American participation but, significantly, excluding the Soviet-dominated WPC.) When the WPC meeting convened in Stockholm, having been postponed because of the AAPSO meeting, it was not surprising that the Chinese delegation (the largest to attend) tried to seize the initiative both in promoting its "national liberation" line, and trying to convert the major 1962 WPC meeting into a propaganda forum for this policy. The Italian member of the WPC Presidential Committee, Velio Spano, described the clash in the Communist daily L'Unita (23 December 1961):

"The subject which gave rise to differences was the designation of the World Congress to be convoked next summer, which some delegations wished to call the Congress 'for general disarmament and peace,' while others wished to call it 'for national independence, peace and disarmament.' In fact, a fundamental contrast was manifested between the positions of those who firmly believe... in the existence of genuine conditions which today render possible the realization of general disarmament... and on the other hand those who have less faith in peaceful coexistence and disarmament, and therefore, place the accent on the basic struggle against imperialism..."

"It was soon evident, whether in plenary session or in commissions, that there was a fundamental contrast between the two political lines and that any attempt at reconciliation would be quite useless. It was therefore necessary to put the question to the vote: 166 delegates voted for a Congress devoted to general disarmament; 24 delegates voted against; one formally abstained from voting. The contrary votes were those of the Chinese, some African and Asian delegations and some isolated European delegates."

Interestingly enough, in the same article the pro-Soviet Italian delegate attempted to quiet those displeased at the fact that for the first time in WPC history a vote had replaced "unity of the whole movement." The silver lining pointed out was that "unity at all costs would, in fact, have been purely formal" and would have contributed to "immobilizing" the world peace movement's activity.

The Chairman of the WPC Presidential Committee, Prof. J.D. Bernal, UK, delivered his report on the international situation and the tasks of the WPC, noting the continuing arms race, colonialist adventurism and the rising sentiment of militarism, especially in West Germany and the USA. He stressed the importance of general disarmament, on the grounds that stopping nuclear weapon tests could only be achieved within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. He added:

"Our main objective is general and complete disarmament.... If

war and annihilation and, in the final analysis, the success of the national liberation movement will be ensured."

Alexander Korneichuk, member of the WPC Presidential Committee and of the CC/CPSU, acclaimed Bernal's proposal to call a "World Congress of Peace Champions" in 1962. While he went into detail on the major international problems, he subordinated all problems to disarmament. The Soviet delegation was principally supported by France, Italy, Portugal, India and several satellites, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

On the Chinese side, WPC Bureau member Liao Cheng-chih maintained that anticolonialism and national liberation should take precedence in the future work of the peace movement. He granted that disarmament was the desire of all people but that, inasmuch as the US was not sincere about achieving disarmament, it was necessary instead to mobilize the peoples of the world into a united "peace-loving" front. This united front, including petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie but relying most on the workers and peasants of the oppressed nations, could serve to avert a world war if it were to combine its efforts with the following three forces: the national liberation movement, the Socialist Camp, and the international workers' movement. For this reason, he said, the Chinese people warmly supported an anti-imperialist "Conference of the Three Continents," as had been decided by the recent AAPSO meeting. Liu Ning-yi (another Chinese delegate and WPC Bureau member) charged that US imperialists used nuclear weapons to frighten the oppressed nations from rising in revolutions; since these nations have discovered they can discount such blackmail, world peace can best be safeguarded by the strength of the national liberation movement. Prior to Liu's speech, Biallo Seydou of Guinea had indicated the trend of his sympathies when, claiming to speak for all Africa, he said: "We are under armed enslavement and persecution by imperialism and colonialism; we want arms. We should arouse the masses of people to rise and struggle for peace, freedom and independence and not to struggle for pacifism...." At the conclusion of Liu's speech the Chinese delegation walked out of the meeting, followed immediately by Guinean and other pro-Chinese Afro-Asian delegates.

When the disputed future Congress was brought to a vote, Japan (in the person of Kaoru Yasui, head of the Japan Council for the Prohibition of A&H Bombs) abstained. While he should have logically supported the Soviet line promoting disarmament, this abstention indicated that the Japanese delegation was committed to support the Chinese, and that the Japanese Communist Party instructs its delegates to WPC meetings how to vote. The Chinese were also supported by delegates from Australia, some Latin Americans, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

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503. The Thermidorean Reaction

Background: Historical parallels are never entirely accurate, but they can be very suggestive. Marxists have a special weakness for such parallels, since they believe that history shows not only what may happen, but what is bound to happen ("determinism"). Naturally, Communists have been particularly interested in the history of revolutions -- and this interest has been mixed with anxiety, since they regard all revolutions prior to 1917 as failures, and fear that their own revolution may fail likewise. The model revolution of history is the French Revolution of 1789, and historians have usually held that it began to fail when, on 27 July 1794--9 Thermidor in the revolutionary calendar--Robespierre was overthrown from power; he was guillotined the next day. His executioners were good revolutionaries, who acted only to save their own necks, but this was the beginning of the end of the Reign of Terror. As Thomas Carlyle wrote:

"... the death of Robespierre was a signal at which great multitudes of men, struck dumb with terror heretofore, rose out of their hiding places; and, as it were, saw one another, how multitudinous they were; and began speaking and complaining. They are countable by the thousand and the million; who have suffered cruel wrong. Ever louder rises the plaint of such a multitude; into a universal sound, into a universal continuous peal, of what they call Public Opinion."

Robespierre was succeeded by a government of mediocrities (most of the best leaders had lost their heads) who soon introduced a new constitution vesting executive powers in a Directory of five men. This Directory, whose most important member was Paul-François Barras, is famous in history for its corruption, some of its members even seeking bribes from powers with which France was at war. In fairness to it, however, it faced an extraordinary problem in the inflation already generated by war with a coalition of European monarchs, and although an attempt was made to check the uncontrolled issuance of paper money (assignats), the Directory failed to solve this problem. Price controls and rationing were tried, but were unsuccessful. While professedly revolutionary, the Directors followed a middle-of-the-road republican policy, on the one hand overcoming the conspiracy of "Gracchus" Babeuf, who wanted to eliminate property distinctions, and who regarded himself as the true heir to the Jacobin revolutionaries, and on the other hand, defeating the reactionary "gilded youth" (Jeunesse dorée) and the royalist-influenced Paris "sections"; the latter were dispersed when the relatively unknown Napoleon Bonaparte (on the orders of Barras) fired a "whiff of grapeshot" at them. As the prestige of the Directors declined, that of Napoleon grew, bolstered by exaggerated reports of his military successes. On 9 November (18 Brumaire) 1799, Napoleon seized power and overthrew the Directory. He established a dictatorship, the Consulate (still nominally republican), with himself as First Consul, assisted by two other Consuls he had appointed. His new regime was approved overwhelmingly in a plebiscite. In 1802, Napoleon became Consul for life; in 1804, he became Emperor of the French.

Leon Trotsky, in his polemics against Stalin, called Stalin's policy one of Thermidorean reaction, and Stalin's government a Thermidorean bureaucracy (see Trotsky's *STALIN*, pp. 401-410). Trotsky cast himself in the role of Robespierre, and he suggested that Stalin was corrupt and lacking in revolutionary ardor. A present-day observer, however, could just as readily make Stalin the Russian Robespierre, and compare the leadership that followed him with the Directory. Like the Directory, the post-Stalin Soviet leadership:

- represents the mediocre survivors of a Reign of Terror.
- forms a "collective," in which members conspire against each other.
- seems to have lost its revolutionary ardor, while clinging to revolutionary terminology.
- replaces ideals of austerity with ideals of bourgeois well-being.
- suppresses opponents on both left and right, the left claiming to be "true revolutionaries," the right including an element of violent, rootless youth.
- struggles hopelessly with the inflation generated by its predecessors (see Guidance 501).

Is Khrushchev then another Napoleon? More likely, he is the Barras to someone else's Napoleon. In any case he reminds us of the opening words in Karl Marx's exercise in drawing historical parallels, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon:

"Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce."

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REAL COSTS IN THE US AND USSR

The following table compares the time a Russian and an American worker must labor to earn some of the necessities of life:

	<u>Russian</u>	<u>American</u>
Overcoat	2 months	27 to 36 hours
Suit	1 to 2 months	25 hours
White shirt	14 hours	1 1/2 hours
Felt hat	27 hours	3 hours
Men's socks	1 3/4 hours	18 minutes
Men's shoes	1 week	5 3/4 hours
Women's shoes	1 to 2 weeks	5 1/2 hours
Women's slip	50 hours	2 hours
Nylons	7 to 8 hours	25 minutes
Nightgown	1 week	2 1/4 hours
Boy's shoes	8 hours	3 3/4 hours
Bacon (lb.)	2 hours	14 minutes
Eggs (doz.)	2 1/4 hours	15 minutes
Milk (qt.)	30 minutes	7 minutes
Butter (lb.)	5 hours	22 minutes
Coffee (lb.)	4 1/2 hours	22 minutes
Lemon (one)	42 minutes	2 minutes
Beef (lb.)	1 1/4 hours	25 minutes
Automobile (\$2,500)	2 1/2 years	142 days
Refrigerator	2 months	11 1/2 days
Vac. cleaner	2 1/2 weeks	3 days
Elec. percolator	13 hours	7 hours
Small radio	1 week	1 day
TV set	2 1/2 months*	10 days*

\*Russian -- 12 inch table model; American -- 21 inch console.